Glorious simplicity by Billiet, Carole
To refer to as: C.M. Billiet, “Sanctioning. Glorious simplicity ”, ENPE Newsletter 2017/June, 6-7 
Sanctioning. Glorious simplicity 
 
Most of us are familiar with the contents of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment 
by through criminal law (Eco-crime Directive). The Eco-Crime Directive requires EU Member States 
to take the necessary measures to ensure that serious environmental offences, which it lists, are 
punishable by penalties that are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (Articles 5 and 7). Regarding 
offenders who are natural persons, criminal penalties meeting these criteria must be provided. It is less 
widely known that this sanctioning obligation is a specification of the general enforcement obligation 
that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) derived from the principle of loyal cooperation laid down in 
Article 4(3) TEU. According to the ECJ, EU Member States have an enforcement obligation with regard 
to all EU-embedded law and the enforcement must be non-discriminatory (compared to the enforcement 
of pure national law violations of a similar nature and importance), effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. 
 
On 24 January 2017 the Dutch court of Zeeland – West-Brabant, a first instance court, issued a 
judgement in a criminal case (ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2017:288) that holds a little gem: an explicit check of 
the inflicted penalty to the enforcement criteria developed by the ECJ and imposed by the Eco-Crime 
Directive. The offences under consideration included violations of Article 2(35) of Regulation (EC) No 
1013/2006 on shipments of waste, which are serious offences as regards the Eco-Crime Directive. While 
sentencing the offender, a natural person, to twelve months of prison sentence (nine effective, three 
conditional), the court considered “that the imposition of this penalty meets the obligation of Member 
States that violations of EU law have to be followed by an effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanction, which is comparable to the sanctions for equally serious violations of similar national rules” 
(p. 38/46, own translation). This penalty motivation is a primeur for the Netherlands.  
 
The thrilling thing about this explicit check, incorporated in the motivation of the sentence, is that it 
could offer the beginning of a solution to the sanctioning inconsistencies that are observed throughout 
the EU with regard to environmental crime. Sanctioning inconsistencies notoriously exist from Member 
State to Member State but are also present within one same Member State. They involve the sanctioning 
practices in the administrative as well as criminal sanctioning tracks. Regarding the criminal sanctioning 
track they even exist within the resort of one same court of appeal, up to the level of the different 
chambers of one same criminal court. The inconsistencies not only impede on the EU level playing field 
of corporations but also feed the perception of a lack of equity and justice with civil society and 
corporations alike. 
 
If each criminal judge and administrative sanctioning authority could, whenever sanctioning 
environmental offences, consider the non-discriminatory, effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
character of the sanctions to be imposed, a sanctioning practice could emerge where inconsistencies are 
softened. It would definitely be Good Practice to start considering the EU sanctioning requirements in 
each criminal judgment and administrative sanctioning decision when motivating the sanctions. For 
prosecutors it would be Good Practice to motivate the sanctioning requests using those same EU-criteria. 
 
CMB 
